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Libre-échange 
Free Movement of Goods in Canada 
and the United States 
D . A . SOBERMAN* 
En ce qui regarde la circulation des biens, les constitutions américaines et 
canadiennes sont fort différentes l'une de l'autre. Le par. 91(2) de la Loi 
constitutionnelle de 1867 semble attribuer au Parlement fédéral du Canada 
un vaste domaine de compétence économique, mais la jurisprudence, depuis 
les années cinquante, a interprété cette clause de façon très restrictive. Les 
autorités fédérales, d'autre part, ne jouissent pas d'un pouvoir explicite de 
mise en œuvre des traités. En fait, il existe de nombreuses entraves, plus ou 
moins discutables, à la libre circulation des biens à l'intérieur même du 
Canada. 
Aux États-Unis, en revanche, la compétence apparemment limitée du 
Congrès en matière commerciale a été considérée par la Cour suprême 
comme étant l'équivalent d'un pouvoir général de réglementation. D'autre 
part, la Constitution stipule expressément que les traités ratifiés par le Sénat 
ont force de loi, de telle façon que le Gouvernement fédéral se trouve à jouir 
d'un plein pouvoir en ce qui regarde la mise en œuvre des traités. 
Si l'Accord canado-américain sur le libre-échange devait être ratifié, sa 
mise en œuvre ne causerait aucun problème aux États- Unis, mais elle serait 
susceptible d'en soulever au Canada. L'Accord ne s'applique pas à certaines 
questions de juridiction provinciale, comme les politiques d'achat préférentielles, 
les standards de qualité en matière de santé et de sécurité ou la réglementation 
professionnelle. Ces exclusions évitent des conflits entre le fédéral et les 
provinces, mais elles diminuent la portée de l'Accord. Il est peu probable que 
le mécanisme général prévu pour la solution des conflits fonctionne efficacement. 
L'arbitrage obligatoire des cas de dumping ou de droits compensatoires 
apparaît en revanche davantage de nature supranationale : il devrait s'avérer 
l'élément le plus significatif de l'Accord. 
* Professeur, Faculté de droit, Université Queen's, Kingston. Ce texte a été révisé en mars 
1988. 
Les Cahiers de Droit, vol. 29, n° 2, juin 1988, p. 291-322 
(1988) 29 Les Cahiers de Droit 291 
292 Les Cahiers de Droit ( 1988) 29 C. de D. 291 
Pages 
— The Constitutional Framework : United States 292 
— The Constitutional Framework: Canada 294 
1. Development of Trade Regulation Within the United States 296 
1.1. Limits of the Commerce Power 297 
1.2. The Negative Commerce Clause 299 
1.3. Federal Legislation Pre-empting the Field 301 
2. Development of Trade Regulation Within Canada 302 
2.1. Limits of the Trade and Commerce Power 303 
2.2. The Negative Trade and Commerce Aspect 307 
2.3. Federal Legislation Pre-empting the Field 308 
2.4. Free Movement of Goods — An Overview 309 
Conclusion : Some Thoughts on the Consequences of the Free Trade Agreement 
Between Canada and the United States 311 
— Constitutional Aspects 311 
— Implications of Canada's Treaty-Implementing Deficiencies 315 
— The Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution and Enforcement 319 
There are both similarities and striking contrasts between the constitutional 
setting for the free movement of goods in the two North American federations. 
I shall divide this study into three parts : first, a brief examination of the 
constitutional framework with respect to trade ; second, a review of intrafed-
eration trade to the present ; third, some speculative thoughts on the conse-
quences of the Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and the United States 
of America1. 
— The Constitutional Framework : United States 
Historically, the primary goal in the Constitution of the United States (as 
in the Canadian Constitution) was nation building, but there was also clear 
recognition of the importance of creating an economic union. Six provisions 
of the Constitution can be seen as having a direct effect on trade. In Article I, 
two provisions restricted the powers of both Congress and the states to 
burden interstate trade: 
I. The Agreement was signed by both countries, January 2, 1988. At the time of writing, it has 
yet to be ratified and implemented. 
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No tax or duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.2 
No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on 
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's 
inspection Laws : and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any 
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United 
States ; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the 
Congress.3 
In the same article, the powers removed from the states with respect to 
imports were given to Congress : 
The Congress shall have the Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts 
and Excises [...] but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States4; 
Congress was also given the power : 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with Indian Tribes5 ; 
These powers were given added breadth in the final clause of the section, by a 
grant to Congress of the power : 
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers [...]6. 
In addition, the Constitution gives the President and Senate the treaty-
making power : 
[the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur 
[...] ' 
[...] all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.8 
These provisions cumulatively gave clear indication of an intention to 
create a single integrated market for goods : the states were effectively 
prohibited from levying duties, and if Congress itself levied any duties or 
taxes they were required to be uniform throughout the country. Moreover, 
2. Section 9, cl. 5. This provision, by its location in Section 9, which deals with limits on 
Congress's powers, seems to place the limit on Congress rather than on the States. 
3. Section 10, cl. 2. 
4. Section 8, cl. 1. 
5. Section 8, cl. 3. 
6. Section 8, cl. 18. 
7. Article II, Section 2, cl. 2. 
8. Article VI, cl. 2. 
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when the powers of Congress to tax and to levy duties, and "[...] to regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States [...]", were 
combined with the power "[...] to make Treaties [...]" that became "[...] the 
supreme Law of the Land [...]" binding on every state, it was evident that the 
federal government was granted broad powers over the nation as a whole to 
control both interstate and international trade. 
In particular, it should be noted that, while the phrase "[...] among the 
several States [...]" might be expected to invite judicial limits on the federal 
commerce power when its exercise interfered with a state's regulation of its 
own intrastate commerce, the treaty-making power was not subject to such a 
qualification. That power appeared unqualified : a treaty that affected the 
commerce within a single state would take precedence over that state's own 
laws9. 
— The Constitutional Framework : Canada 
In Canada, the constitutional evidence of an intention to create an 
economic union bears only limited similarity to the U.S. provisions. Section 
121 of the Constitution Act, 1867 states: 
All Articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of any one of the 
Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of the 
other Provinces. 
Unlike its American analogue, this injunction against provincial restrictions 
on trade referred only to goods produced in a sister province and not to goods 
from outside Canada. However, section 122, a transitional provision, placed 
limits on all provincial customs and excise laws: it permitted those laws to 
continue in force "[...] until altered by the Parliament of Canada", thus 
necessarily implying that the provinces had surrendered to the federal 
legislature all power to legislate further with respect to customs duties on 
goods from other countries l0. 
Section 91(3) allocated "The raising of Money by any Mode or System of 
Taxation" to "[...] the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of 
Canada [...]", including the power to levy excise taxes and duties on goods. In 
9. The prevailing opinion is that once the treaty-making power is exercised in conformity with 
the Constitution, it may be used to validate federal legislation that would otherwise be 
unconstitutional. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
10. A further transitional section 123, eliminated double taxation of goods imported, from 
outside Canada, to one province but destined for another province. In effect, the ultimate 
receiver of the goods would pay only the higher tax of that levied in the two provinces. 
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addition, section 91(2) gave Parliament exclusive power over, "The Regulation 
of Trade and Commerce". Since this last phrase contains no qualifying words 
analogous to the American commerce power's "[...] among the several States 
[...]", it might be imagined that the Canadian trade and commerce section 
gave greater power to Parliament than the American commerce power gave 
to Congress. Indeed, this view is strengthened by the closing words of section 
91, which seem expressly to restrict provincial legislative powers : 
And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this 
Section [including "the regulation of trade and commerce"] shall not be deemed 
to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the 
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the 
Legislatures of the Provinces, [emphasis added]. 
Finally, with respect to the distribution of powers, it should be noted that 
the opening words of section 91 gave a general (and residual) power to the 
federal government, "[...] to make Laws for the Peace, Order and good 
Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the 
Classes of Subjects [...] assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the 
Provinces [...]". 
With respect to treaties, we should remember that the Constitution Act, 
1867 — the first British statute to grant almost complete domestic self 
government to a colony — did not contemplate the establishment of an 
entirely independent nation. The Dominion of Canada remained a part of the 
British Empire and subject to control from Westminster ". Accordingly, it 
was no doubt deliberate that an express grant of power to the government of 
Canada to make treaties was omitted from the Constitution. I say "deliberate" 
because the subject of treaties was dealt with expressly in section 132 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867: 
The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or 
properfor performing the Obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof, as 
Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties 
between the Empire and such Foreign Countries, [emphasis added]. 
11. Briefly, the legal controls were : 
a) The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28-29 Vict. c. 63 (U.K.), remained in force with 
respect to Canada, preventing Canadian laws from taking effect so as to interfere with 
any Imperial statute that applied to Canada. 
b) Pursuant to sections 55 and 56 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Governor General, 
who was the head of state appointed by the Imperial cabinet, retained the traditional 
colonial power of reserving assent indefinitely, at his discretion, to any Canadian 
statute. Moreover, even if he assented, within two years the Imperial cabinet could 
disallow the statute. 
c) Under the Judicial Committee Act, 1833, 3-4 Will. IV, c. 41 (U.K.), the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council continued to be the final court of appeal for all 
decisions of Canadian courts. 
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This section was analogous to the American treaty-making power in that 
it granted the central government the power to pass and implement laws — 
with respect to "Empire treaties" — even when the subject matter concerned 
provincial "obligations", that is, was within provincial jurisdiction. However, 
the section does not mention "Canadian treaties", and it is highly unlikely 
that failure to do so was an oversight. Rather, it was consistent with Canada 's 
dependent status, that it received no treaty-making power to enable it to enter 
into international agreements on its own behalf. The Imperial government 
alone would speak for the whole of the British Empire in international 
relations. 
An important difference from the American position arose from the fact 
that in the British system of government treaties are non self-executing : they 
require domestic legislation in order to implement any change in internal, 
municipal law — hence the need to give legislative power to the Parliament of 
Canada to implement Empire treaties. Of course, no such legislative power 
was granted for a non-existent Canadian treaty power. 
As a result, any constraints on the provinces constitutional powers to 
interfere with trade seemed to depend on the scope to be given to the words of 
section 121, that goods of other provinces "[...] shall [...] be admitted free 
[...]", and to the federal power to regulate trade and commerce under section 
91(2). 
1. Development of Trade Regulation Within the United States 
The purpose of the commerce clause is clearly stated in the following 
quotation from a leading American constitutional scholar, Professor Corwin : 
Unquestionably, one of the great advantages anticipated from the grant to 
Congress of power over commerce was that State interferences with trade, 
which had become a source of sharp discontent under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, would be thereby brought to an end. As Webster stated in his argument for 
appelant in Gibbons v. Ogden : "The prevailing motive was to regulate commerce ; 
to rescue it from the embarrassing and destructive consequences, resulting from 
the legislation of so many different States, and to place it under the protection of 
a uniform law". I2 
The limits of the principles enshrined in the Constitution were nonetheless 
frequently tested by the States. Indeed, a review of the legislative endeavours 
of members states of both the U.S. and Canadian federation as well as, more 
12. E.S. CORWIN, The Constitution and What it Means Today, 14lh ed. (Revised by H.W. 
Chase and C.R. Ducat), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 67. 
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recently, of the European Community, not surprisingly confirms a tendency 
in autonomous member governments to establish their own priorities and to 
try to protect their own interests as well as improve the lot of their citizens, in 
competition with other member governments and with the priorities of the 
central government. In federal constitutions, of course, the interests of 
member states as separate units receive explicit recognition as a legitimate 
public good ; otherwise we should have only unitary states. What ensues from 
the assertion of the priorities of members states is a delicate balancing process 
of the interests of one state with another and with the collective national 
interest. The striking of the balance results from an interplay of forces 
between the principal actors, with the highest court as umpire of the federal 
system. 
The absorbing history ofthat interplay with respect to the free movement 
of goods in both the United States and Canada has been exhaustively 
recorded and well interpreted in each country. For our purposes it will be 
more useful to summarize briefly the history, compare the current positions, 
and then turn to the implications of a comprehensive trade agreement 
between the two nations. 
There are three main legal elements in the equation governing the free 
movement of goods in the United States. First, are the limits that the 
constitution may place on the exercise of the federal commerce power. 
Second, are the limits put upon the states' ability to affect commerce, 
resulting from the constitutional fact of allocating the commerce power to 
Congress — frequently called the "negative" commerce clause. Third, given 
the paramountcy of valid federal legislation over state legislation, is the 
question of whether a federal legislative scheme has "preempted the field", 
invalidating any state legislation in the same area. 
1.1 Limits of the Commerce Power 
In the early years of the federation, Congress was not very active in 
regulating interstate commerce, especially in the period dominated by the 
liberal theory of the state. Congress began to intervene in order to achieve 
new social goals only after the passing of the fourteenth amendment13. In the 
period beginning after the Civil War and extending to 1937, important federal 
13. Article XIV, Section 1 : "[•••] nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law [...]"( 1868). While the earlier ( 1791 ) Fifth Amendment, 
used almost identical language that applied to the federal government, the Fourteenth 
amendment made clear, in terms of political philosophy, the limits on the power of all 
governments to interfere with rights of private property, including freedom to contract. 
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economic and social legislation was struck down by the Supreme Court as 
unconstitutional, more often because it offended individual property rights l4 
than because it infringed state's rights. Even in that era, however, important 
economic legislation, such as the Interstate Commerce Act, 1887 (regulation 
of common carriers), and the Sherman Act, 1890 (anti-trust), were enacted 
and subsequently found valid 15. The range of subjects is extremely broad, as 
noted by Professor Smith : 
First, an activity may constitute commerce although it be non-commercial. [...] 
[T]he carrying of liquor for personal use, the transportation of a woman as a 
mistress or as a bride, the ranging of cattle and the flight of a witness, or perhaps 
of a flock of birds, are commerce. 
Second, activity is none the less commerce because the transportation or 
movement involves only intangibles. Thus the transmission of information by 
telegraph and telephone, communication by radio waves, and the transportation 
or transmission of gas and electricity are commerce. [...] [Even] the passage of 
light rays [of a cinema projection over the Canadian border] constituted 
importation [...] [and was thus commerce]. I6 
The Shreveport Rate Case 17 marked the clear recognition of Congress's 
ability under the commerce power to extend its regulation over entirely 
intrastate activity. The Railroad Commission of Texas had set intrastate rates 
between Dallas and points in eastern Texas at a lower level than the 
reasonable interstate rates (set by the Interstate Commerce Commission) 
from those same eastern Texas points across the Louisiana border to 
Shreveport. The Texas rates gave a competitive advantage to Dallas merchants 
over out-of-state Shreveport merchants in shipping goods to eastern Texas. 
The I.C.C. ordered the carriers to desist from charging unequal rates from 
Dallas. 
The Supreme Court, in upholding the power the I.C.C. to make such an 
order, said : 
14. SeeT. HELLER, J. PELKMANS,'The Federal Economy: Law and Economic Integration and 
the Positive State — The U.S.A. and Europe Compared in an Economic Perspective", in 
Integration Through Law, Vol. 1, Book 1, A Political, Legal and Economic Overview, (M. 
CAPPELLETTI, M. SECCOMBE & J. WEILER, Ed.), New York, W. de Gruyter, 1986, p. 245, 
p. 284, 285. 
15. A substantial list of federal legislation, in the fields of: labour relations, trade regulation, 
transportation and communications, public morals and criminal law, and marketing, 
occupying some six pages of text, may be found in A. SMITH, The Commerce Power in 
Canada and the United States, Toronto, Butterworths, 1963, p. 247-253. 
16. Id., p. 262. 
17. Houston, E. & W. Texas Rly v. United States, 234 U.S. 342. For a full discussion, see 
SMII H, supra, note 15, Chapter 12, and esp. p. 393-398. 
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[Congressional] authority, extending to these interstate carriers as instruments 
of interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the right to control their operations 
in all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic 
that the control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the 
efficiency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under 
which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without 
molestation or hindrance.ls 
Subsequently, the court extended the principle to many other instances, 
permitting Congress to regulate entirely intrastate activities because they 
affected the flow of interstate commerce l9. 
In 1937, the watershed decision in National Labor Relations Board v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation20, and other attendant cases2I, established 
firmly the power of Congress to regulate almost every facet of trade. Even the 
realm of the state's own activities, which as recently as 1976 was held to be 
immune to the commerce power22, was in 1985 held to be subject to the 
federal power, the state's only recourse being through its political representation 
in Congress23. 
1.2. The Negative Commerce Clause 
Beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden in 182424, the Supreme Court was 
continually confronted by state legislation enacted to control trade and 
transportation at its borders. According to Professor Corwin : 
The commerce clause comprises [...] except for the due process of law clause of 
Amendment XIV, the most important basis for judicial review, in limitation of 
State power [...] Of the approximately 1400 cases which reached the Supreme 
Court under the clause prior to 1900, the overwhelming proportion stemmed 
18. Shreveporl Rate Cases, p. 351. 
19. See, for example, Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (regulation of stockyards and 
meatpackers) ; Olsen v. Chicago Board of Trade, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (regulation of trading in 
grain futures) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (movement by taxi of 
passengers in the City of Chicago between interstate trains). 
20. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
21. See CORWIN, supra, note 12, p. 62, 445. The most notorious judicial restriction on the 
powers of Congress occurred when the Supreme Court struck down use the commerce 
power to eliminate child labour in the production of goods bound for interstate commerce. 
See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). In the following twenty years, that decision 
was undermined, especially in Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 299 
U.S. 334(1937), and finally overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100(1941). For 
an exhaustive discussion, see A. SMITH, supra, note 15, p. 318-345. 
22. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
23. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 463 U.S. 528 (1985). 
24. 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). 
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from State legislation [...] [T]he guiding lines in construction of the clause were 
initially laid down by the Court from the point of view of its operation as a curb 
on State power, rather than its operation as a source of national power.25 
In Gibbons, the State of New York had granted an exclusive licence for 
steam boat service across the Hudson River. New Jersey passed retaliatory 
legislation, and there were threats of similar conflict breaking out elsewhere. 
In the opinions of the Supreme Court, delivered by Chief Justice Marshall 
and his associates, the New York law was unconstitutional on two grounds — 
first because Congress had occupied the field by passing its own federal 
licensing act in 1793, and second, because the Constitution had delegated the 
field of regulating interstate boat transportation exclusively to Congress, 
"leaving nothing for the state to act upon"26. 
However, the latter seemingly dogmatic exclusion of state regulation 
was not long sustained27 ; the court, in a long line of cases extending into the 
1980's28, moved from one test to another in determining whether state 
legislation asserted a vital state interest that deserved protection despite some 
interference with interstate commerce. The earliest test was whether the 
subject matter of legislation as primarily "local" (and thus valid) or "national" 
(invalid), the test in the middle period was whether its effects on interstate 
commerce was "indirect" (valid) or "direct" (invalid), and finally, since the 
1930's, a balancing test of the importance of the affected state and federal 
interests29. 
Today, the negative commerce clause, circumscribes the legislative 
powers of the state's to burden interstate commerce. The primary requirement 
is that legislation not be discriminatory against interstate commerce ; discrim-
inatory legislation is per se unconstitutional, but it may be a difficult question 
of characterization to decide whether a statute is discriminatory. Even if not 
discriminatory between in-state and out-of-state goods, a statute must not 
burden commerce unduly, and here the court engages in balancing the 
regulating state's interest and the larger national interest, or sometimes the 
25. CORWIN, supra, note 12, p. 67. 
26. Id., p. 227. 
27. See Wilhonv. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829), where the Court validated 
Delaware's power to damn a navigable stream used by a vessel licensed under federal law. 
28. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
29. For an excellent analysis of this development, see D.P. KOMMERS & M. WAELBROECK, 
"Legal Integration and the Free Movement of Goods: The American and European 
Experience" in Integration Through Law, Vol. 1, Book 3, Forces and Potential for a 
European Identity, supra, note 14, p. 165, p. 169-197. 
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interest of another state30 . Under these criteria states have been able to levy 
reasonable, non-discriminatory taxes and to regulate the entry of goods with 
respect to health and safety. As well, states have sometimes been able to give 
preferences to their citizens in use of their own resources31, and to sustain 
government procurement preferences for their citizens32. While the sum total 
of these burdens on interstate commerce is considerable, on the whole, the 
negative commerce clause has placed substantial limits on the states' ability to 
restrict interstate commerce. 
1.3. Federal Legislation Pre-empting the Field 
Professor Heller states : 
It is uncontested that states may not pass legislation which directly conflicts 
with or contradicts national statutory controls. A broad reading of pre-emption 
could imply that a failure by the Federal Government to intervene in particular 
markets might be held to represent an affirmative decision about the desirable 
level of regulation in a unified national market. This implicit act of pre-emption 
would negate the possibility of varied local policies. However, the modern 
history of judicial construction of pre-emption has not usually functioned as an 
instrument for promoting an increasingly comprehensive centralization of 
government structure. 
[...] Contemporary pre-emption doctrine in the economic field has generally 
required a clear and explicit Congressional intent to void local powers.33 
He goes on to note that, "The actual legal structure of economic regulation in 
the U.S. is quite mixed at the present time" and that, "[...] the best description 
of the overall system would emphasize the existence of concurrent regulatory 
jurisdiction between state and national governments"34. 
Emphasizing again the breadth of the commerce power and its para-
mountcy, we can see that there is little constitutional restraint on Congress to 
pre-empt particular fields of regulation and exclude state activity. However, 
30. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 ( 1977). Washington 
challenged a North Carolina rule that effectively prevented Washington apples from being 
sold under the Washington state label of quality in North Carolina. The Court declared the 
North Carolina rule invalid. See, KOMMERS & WAELBROECK, supra, note 29, p. 194, 195. 
31. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Reeves, Inc. 
v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). For an illuminating discussion of this subject, see W.C. 
GRAHAM, "Government Procurement Policies : GATT, the EEC, and the United States", in 
TREBILOCK et al (ed.), Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union, Toronto, U. of T. 
Press, 1983, p. 355, p. 375-392. 
32. Id., p. 389-391. 
33. T. HELLER, J. PELKMANS, supra, note 14, p. 295. 
34. Id., p. 297. 
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as in any federation, in the United States it is considered politically expedient 
to permit substantial economic regulation by the members states. Nevertheless, 
the combination of judicial limits on state action by the negative commerce 
clause, and political decisions of Congress to regulate an area in the national 
interest keeps state regulation of the free movement of goods under control. 
The treaty power may here be mentioned briefly. For a treaty to be valid, 
it must be passed bona fide (I have found no case where the good faith of 
Congress has been successfully challenged), and must not contradict the 
words of the Constitution itself. It then becomes the "[...] supreme Law of the 
Land [...]". Professor Corwin stated that, 
F r o m the t ime of the Jay Treaty (1794) d o w n to the present , the Na t i ona l 
Government has entered into many treaties. . . a l though [the subject ma t t e r 
was] . . . conceded to be otherwise within the exclusivejur isdict ion of the S t a t e s . 3 5 
Indeed, the extent of the treaty power provoked constitutional amendment 
proposals to reduce its effect on states' rights, the most well known — and 
almost successful — being the Bricker Amendment in 195236. With respect to 
any general trade agreement with Canada, then, the treaty power can be a 
potent instrument of the federal government in imposing a national scheme 
upon the states. 
2. Development of Trade Regulation Within Canada 
Unlike the Confederal period in American history, when conflicting 
state legislation on matters of trade caused serious problems37 the pre-
Confederation years in British North America were not particularly fractious 
with respect to trade among the colonies themselves. Indeed, with the 
American Civil War fresh in their minds, the Fathers of Confederation, 
having opted for a federal system, seemed more concerned to assure a 
politically strong central government38. To that end, the 1867 Constitution 
35. CORWIN, supra, note 12, p. 171. See also, C.H. M C L A U G H L I N , "The Scope of the Treaty 
Power in the United States", 42 Minnesota Law Review 709 (1958), and 43 Minnesota Law 
Review 651 (1959). 
36. M C L A U G H L I N , id., 43 Minnesota I AW Review 651 (1959), p. 704-713. 
37. Supra, note 12. 
38. At the Québec Conference in October of 1864, in the midst of the Civil War, John A. 
Macdonald stated : 
The various States of the adjoining Republic had always acted as separate sovereignties. [...] 
The primary error at the formation of their constitution was that each state reserved to itself 
all sovereign rights, save the small portion delegated. We must reverse this process by 
strengthening the General Government and conferring on the Provincial bodies only such 
powers as may be required for local purposes. All sectional prejudices and interests can be 
legislated for by local legislatures. 
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gave to the federal government crucial powers over the provinces, that the 
Imperial government traditionnally retained over colonies39. As noted earlier, 
the broad sweep of the federal power over "The Regulation of Trade and 
Commerce" appeared to be almost unlimited. 
2.1. Limits of the Trade and Commerce Power 
It is perhaps to be expected that whereas in the United States, with the 
background of trade conflict in the Confederal period, the Supreme Court 
should interpret a potentially narrow power of commerce among the several 
states increasingly broadly, in Canada, without such history of conflict, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should interpret a very broad initial 
power much more narrowly. Such may be the inherent concern of an ultimate 
court that as umpire of a federation it must maintain what it perceives to be an 
essential balance between central government and member states. 
In any event, to Canadians the story of the virtual neutralizing of the 
trade and commerce clause is a familiar one. As Professor A. Smith has said, 
"[...] the subject has the allure of antithesis, of paradox. Congress has been 
able to do so much with so little ; Parliament has been able to do so little with 
so much"40. In Severn v. The Queen*[, the first decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada with respect to the trade and commerce power, the court 
held provincial legislation requiring a licence for a wholesale liquor business 
to be invalid as being in conflict with federal legislation under the power. The 
case was not appealed to the Privy Council, but subsequent decisions of the 
Privy Council over the next forty years steadily eroded the trade and 
commerce power in favour of provincial legislative authority over "Property 
an Civil Rights in the Province"42. 
The low point was reached in two cases in the early 1920's. First, in Re 
Board of Commerce Act*1, the federal government invoked the trade and 
As reported in G.P. BROWNE, Documents on the Confederation of British North America, 
Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1969, p. 94. 
39. The federal government was given the power to : "appoints the executive head of each 
Province" and all superior and county court judges; reserve or "[...] disallow any [...] 
provincial legislation within one year of its passage [...]"; "declare '[l]ocal works and 
undertakings..., although wholly situate within the Province... to be for the general 
advantage of Canada'" and within federal legislative power. See D.A. SOBERMAN, "The 
Canadian Federal Experience — Selected Issues", in Integration Through Law, Vol. 1, 
Book 1, supra, note 14, p. 513, p. 515. 
40. SMITH, supra, note 15, p. 4. 
41. (1878)2S.C.R. 70. 
42. The Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92 (13). 
43. [1922] 1 A.C. 191. 
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commerce power to validate certain anticombines provisions as well provisions 
to deal with post First World War hoarding and price gouging. In striking 
down the legislation, Viscount Haldane suggested that the trade and commerce 
power was "merely ancillary" and could be used only in aid of some other 
federal authority44. Then, in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider*5, 
the trade and commerce power was held to be ineffective to validate federal 
labour dispute legislation. 
Subsequently, in over half a century there has been a slow, and still very 
tentative recovery of the trade and commerce power. In Proprietary Articles 
Trade Association v. A.G. of Canada46, the Privy Council found certain anti-
combines privisions to be a valid exercise of the federal criminal law power, 
and thus found it unnecessary to consider whether they might be valid under 
the trade and commerce power. However, Lord Atkin said : 
Their Lordships merely propose to dissociate themselves from the construction 
suggested in argument of a passage in the judgment in the Board of Commerce 
Case under which it was contended that the power to regulate trade and 
commerce could be invoked only in furtherance of a general power which 
Parliament possessed independently of it. No such restriction is properly to be 
inferred from that judgment. The words of the statute [the Constitution Act] 
must receive their proper construction where they stand as giving an independent 
authority to Parliament over the particular subject-matter. 47 
Thus began the resuscitation of the power. 
Appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were abolished 
in 1949, and the Supreme Court of Canada no longer stood in its shadow. 
Professor Hogg asserts that, "Since the abolition of appeals to the Privy 
Council there has been a resurgence of the trade and commerce power"48. In 
the marketing of farm products, and especially the marketing of wheat, the 
Supreme Court has validated federal legislation49. Even so, it would seem 
that Hogg's use of "resurgence" is somewhat overstated. There have been 
several setbacks, decisions of the Supreme Court that continue to strike down 
federal regulatory schemes as being unwarranted attempts to infringe on 
44. See N. FINKEI.STEIN, Laskin's Canadian Constitutional Law, 5th ed., 2 Vol., Toronto, 
Carswell, 1986, p. 425. 
45. [1925] A.C. 396. 
46. [1931] A.C. 310. 
47. Id, p. 326. 
48. P.W. HOGG, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed., Toronto, Carswell, 1985, p. 443-452. 
49. Murphy v. CP.R., [ 1958] S.C.R. 626; The Queen v. Klassen, (1959) 20 D.L.R. (2d) 406 
(Man. CA., leave refused before S.C.C.); Re Agricultural Products Marketing, [1978] 2 
S.C.R. 1198; Caloil Inc. v. A.G. of Canada, [1971] S.C.R. 543. The last-mentioned case 
created an exclusive market in part of Canada for Western Canadian oil. 
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"local trade", subject matter that falls under provincial property and civil 
rights jurisdiction. Thus two federal schemes for enforcing national product 
standards and labelling were found unconstitutional in 197950. 
A major case in the mid 1970's concerned Canada's attempt to cope with 
"double-digit"inflation5I. The federal Parliament passed legislation to regulate 
wages in the federal public sector and in the entire private sector of the 
economy, including those employees ordinarily under provincial jurisdiction. 
In the reference, the federal government claimed three bases of valid federal 
power. The most vigorous claim was made under the "national dimensions" 
doctrine, the assertion that inflation had become a matter of longer term 
national importance enabling Parliament to exercise its general power of 
peace, order and good government in order to regulate the economy. That 
claim failed : the legislation was upheld by the Supreme Court on the second 
basis — solely as an exercise of the temporary emergency power aspect of 
peace, order and good government. 
One might have thought that the third claim based on the trade and 
commerce power might have succeeded. Indeed, Professor Hogg notes that, 
"[...] Laskin, C.J. included one paragraph which indicated that he might have 
been favourably disposed to an argument that the general trade and commerce 
power could have sustained the Act"52, but ultimately the Chief Justice 
sustained the legislation on the basis of the emergency power alone. No 
reference to trade and commerce is found in the other opinions in the case. 
In the same year, MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd. was decided53. 
There the Supreme Court invalidated certain provisions of the Trade-Marks 
Act dealing with unfair business practices and creating civil remedies, because 
the civil causes of action were found to be primarily matters within provincial 
jurisdiction over property and civil rights. Nevertheless, Laskin C.J. suggested 
a slender and essentially new basis for federal jurisdiction — if the remedies 
had been part of a larger, national "[...] regulatory scheme [...]" administered 
by a "[...] federally-appointed agency [...]"54. 
In 1976, Parliament amended the Combines Investigation Act by creating 
a number of civil remedies. As noted above, combines legislation had earlier 
50. Dominion Stores Ltd. v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.CR. 844; Labatt Breweries of Canada Lid. 
v. A.G. of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 594. 
51. Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373. 
52. HOGG, supra, note 48, p. 451. 
53. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134. 
54. Id., p. 158, 165. 
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been validated under the federal criminal law power55. The new amendments 
marked a clear intention of Parliament to move from the criminal law power 
to the trade and commerce power, as with its American counterpart, the 
Sherman Act. In A.G. of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation 
Ltd.56, the Supreme Court had to consider whether the Attorney-General of 
Canada was competent to initiate proceedings in a prosecution under the 
amended Act. Although the criminal law of Canada is federal, under section 
92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the provinces have jurisdiction over 
"[...] the administration of justice in the province [...]"; accordingly, criminal 
prosecutions had traditionally been in the hands of the provincial attorneys-
general. However, the majority opinion held that the Attorney-General of 
Canada was competent to prosecute under the criminal law power. In a 
concurring minority opinion, Dickson J., as he then was, characterized the 
relevant provisions as valid under both the criminal law power and the trade 
and commerce power and that the federal Attorney-General was competent 
to prosecute under both heads of power. He found the legislation to be a valid 
exercise of the trade and commerce power on the basis of a series of test 
stemming from Laskin C.J.'s dicta in Macdonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd.51 
Dickson J, set out the following test : 
[...] [Laskin, C.J.] cites as possible indicia for a valid exercise of the general 
trade and commerce power the presence of a national regulatory scheme, the 
oversight of a regulatory agency and a concern with trade in general rather than 
with an aspect of a particular business. To this list I would add what to my mind 
would be even stronger indications of valid general regulation of trade and 
commerce, namely (i) that the provinces jointly or severally would be constitu-
tionally incapable of passing such an enactment, and (ii) that failure to include 
one or more provinces or localities would jeopardize successful operation in 
other parts of the country. 
The above does not purport to be an exhaustive list, nor is the presence of any or 
all of these indicia necessarily decisive.58 
In what might be described as a peculiarly Canadian approach, Dickson 
J. seems to be fashioning a "national interest" test, when examining federal 
regulation, by emphasizing the impact on the national economy of conduct 
otherwise traditionally within provincial jurisdiction59. This view of the trade 
55. Supra, note 46. 
56. [1983] 2 S C R . 206. 
57. Supra, note 53. 
58. A.G. of Canada v. Canadian National Transportalion Ltd.. supra, note 56, 267-268. For an 
illuminating analysis of Dickson J.'s opinion, see J.D. WHYTE, "Constitutional Aspects of 
Economic Development Policy",in R. SIMEON, Division ofPowers and Public Policy,Vol. 
61, Toronto, U. of T. Press, 1985, p. 29, p. 57-63. 
59. This relatively formal approach is in contrast with the functional American approach in the 
Shrevcport Rate Cases, supra, note 18. 
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and commerce power seems to present the best hope for its further strengthening. 
At present three Court of Appeal decisions, relying on Dickson J. 's approach, 
have upheld the validity of civil remedies for combines violations, under the 
trade and commerce power. Two have been appealed to the Supreme Court 
but have not yet been decided60. 
2.2. The Negative Trade and Commerce Aspect 
The Canadian evolution in this area is in sharp contrast to that of the 
United States. Once again, a tempting initial impression might be that the 
Canadian Constitution created more constraints on provincial power : not 
only were provinces prohibited from legislating customs duties and excises61, 
but section 121 also states that goods of any one province shall "[...] be 
admitted free into each of the other Provinces". Do these oracular words 
simply mean "free of customs duties and excises", thus being in a sense 
redundant, or do they mean free of other, non-fiscal impediments ? One might 
think that such an argument could be persuasively made, but in two cases 
where the argument was put it was rejected62. However, in a case concerning a 
federal marketing scheme, Mr. Justice Rand suggested that section 121 might 
have a broader application : 
I take s. 121, apart from customs duties, to be aimed against trade regulation 
which is designed to place fetters upon or raise impediments to or otherwise 
restrict or limit the free flow of commerce across the Dominion as if provincial 
boundaries did not exist.63 
To date no case has been decided in which this view was determinative of 
the issue before the court. 
As might be expected in light of the virtual neutralizing of the trade and 
commerce power, its negative aspect as a limit on provincial power to impede 
interprovincial trade has not been great. An important area of provincial 
regulation, with undoubted effects on interprovincial trade, has been the 
establishment of agricultural products marketing schemes. Typically, a scheme 
60. A.G. of Canada v. Québec Ready Mix Inc., [1985] 2 F.C. 40 (Fed. CA.); City National 
Leasing Ltd v. General Motors ofCanada Ltd., (1984) 12D.L.R.(4th)273(Ont. CA.),both 
under appeal. BBM Bureau of Measurement v. Director of Investigation and Research, 
[1985] 1 F.C. 173 (Fed. CA.), apparently is not under appeal. 
61. Supra, note 10 and accompanying text. 
62. Gold Seal Ltd. v. Dominion Express Co., ( 1921 ) 62 S.CR. 424; Atlantic Smoke Shops Ltd. 
v. Conlon, [1943] A.C. 550. 
63. Murphy v. C. P. R., supra, note 49, p. 642. This view was supported by four judges of nine, in 
Re Agricultural Products Marketing, supra, note 49. 
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creates a marketing monopoly for a provincial board. The board sets prices 
and quotas for producers who must sell their entire output to the board. The 
purpose is to stabilize farm prices and assure farmers of a reasonable market 
share. Such schemes, if undertaken by private-sector actors, would be 
conspiracies in restraint of trade since they control the market and eliminate 
competitors. Yet as undertakings by provincial governments they have 
generally been upheld by the courts64 . 
Since 1971, however, several provincial schemes have been struck down 
as interfering directly with interprovincial trade6 5 . The Supreme Court also 
invalidated a Government of Saskatchewan scheme for allocating and pricing 
potash exported from the province by individual producers6 6 . Nevertheless, 
it is fair to say that on the whole, constraints on provincial regulatory activity 
on the ground that the activity interferes with interprovincial trade and 
commerce have not been substantial ; in any event, these constraints have 
been much less effective than has been the negative commerce clause in the 
United States. 
2.3. Federal Legislation Pre-empting the Field 
In principle in Canada as in other federations, when a valid federal law is 
in direct conflict with an otherwise valid provincial law the federal law is 
paramount and renders the provincial law inoperative to the extent of the 
conflict67. In the absence of direct conflict, Professor Hogg has asked: 
Where the federal Parliament has enacted a law on a particular topic, does this 
preclude a province from enacting a different law on the same topic? If the 
provincial law does not contradict the federal law, but adds to it or supplements 
it, is the provincial law rendered inoperative by the federal law? [...] The short 
answer [...] is that only express contradiction suffices to invoke the paramountcy 
doctrine. [...] 
Canadian courts, by confining the doctrine of paramountcy to such a narrow 
compass, have rejected a "covering the field" (or negative implication) test of 
64. Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, [1938] A.C. 708 ; Re Farm Products 
Marketing Act (Ontario), [1975] S.C.R. 198; Carnation Co. Ltd. v. Québec Agricultural 
Marketing Board, [ 1968] S.C.R. 238 ; Re Agricultural Products Marketing, supra, note 49. 
65. A.G. of Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg & Poultry Association, [1971] S.C.R. 689; Burns 
Foods Ltd. v. A.G. of Manitoba, [1975] I S.C.R. 494. 
66. Central Canada Potash Co. Ltd. et al. v. Government of Saskatchewan et al.. [1979] 1 
S.C.R. 42. 
67. Tenant v. The Union Bank of Canada, [1894] A.C. 31. See especially, W.R. LEDERMAN, 
"The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Provincial Laws in Canada", (1963) 9 McGill 
L.J. 185. 
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inconsistency, which is employed by the courts of the United States and 
Australia.6S 
Accordingly, the existence of a federal regulatory scheme does not preclude a 
province legislating in the same area, so long as there is no direct conflict. And 
the Supreme Court of Canada has gone to extraordinary lengths to save 
provincial legislation by determining that there is no conflict69. 
2.4. Free Movement of Goods — An Overview 
We can see that the constitutional position of the federal government 
and the courts in creating a common market in goods has been weak; 
Canadian provinces have been relatively unrestricted in their activities when 
compared with American states. This situation and its effect on the Canadian 
economic union has received increasing attention in recent years, especially 
after the election in 1976 of the Parti Québécois Government in Québec, on a 
platform of "sovereignty-association". That government proposed that Québec 
become a politically independent nation and form an economic association, 
similar to the EC, with the rest of Canada. Although the proposal was 
rejected in a referendum in May 1980, it led to an explosion of research and 
writing — and polemics — on every aspect of the state of the Canadian 
nation. 
Political scientists, economists, sociologists and lawyers all contributed 
to the outpouring. In particular, the idea of an Québec/Canada economic 
association was a catalyst for those already interested in the EC to analyze 
Canada's economy as it was at the time and how it would be affected by the 
Parti Québécois proposals70. Many comparisons were made with the EC. 
Moreover, to counter the Québec proposals, several task forces set out to 
68. HOGG, supra, note 48, p. 358. 
69. In Ross v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 5, the defendant was convicted of 
impaired driving under the federal Criminal Code, and pursuant to powers granted under 
the Code the judge prohibited him from driving for six months, "[...] except Monday to 
Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 5:45 p.m. in the course of employment and going to and from work" 
(p. 7). However, on conviction under the federal Code, the applicable provincial Highway 
Traffic Act automatically suspended his driver's licence entirely, thus completely preventing 
the defendant from driving. The result was to nullify the penalty carefully designed by the 
court for the particular defendant. Surprisingly to anyone not familiar with the Canadian 
jurisprudence regarding paramountcy, the Supreme Court said that there was no conflict, 
that the provincial law was valid, and that the defendant simply was unable to get the 
benefit of the "[...] indulgence granted under the federal legislation" (p. 13). 
70. J.-P. CHARBONNEAU & G. PAQUETTE, L'Option, Montréal, Les Éd. de l'Homme Ltée., 
1978; G. BERGERON, Ce Jour-là... le RÉFÉREMDVM, Montréal, Les Éd. Quinze, 1978. 
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make extensive counterproposals, and one in particular, the Task Force on 
Canadian Unity, was sponsored by the federal government71. All of these 
groups devoted a substantial portion of their reports to economic union 
questions. 
There have also been a number of important economic studies of the 
issues72, all showing that there are substantial barriers to interprovincial 
trade in Canada, in many instances more serious that in the EC. The most 
exhaustive studies were undertaken by the Royal Commission on the Economic 
Union and Development Prospects for Canada established in 1982, under the 
chairmanship of the Honourable Donald S. Macdonald, a former federal 
Minister of Finance. Its three-volume report was published in the autumn of 
198573, followed by seventy-two volumes of research studies74. 
The conclusions based on economic data appear to suggest that the costs 
of interprovincial barriers to trade do not amount to a large proportion of 
total interprovincial trade7S. Indeed barriers created by federal programs and 
regulations are believed to create greater distortions76. However, there is a 
recognition that this quantitative data may tell us little about the dynamic 
effects on the economy. The Macdonald Report admits that : 
This is a field, however, where estimates are imprecise and controversial. In the 
foreign-trade field, for example, some recent estimates suggest that the gains 
71. J.-L. PÉPIN, J.P. ROBARTS et ai, The Task Force on Canadian Unity: A Future Together, 
Ottawa, Supply and Services, 1979; J. VIAU, et al, Towards a New Canada, Ottawa, 
Canadian Bar Foundation, 1978; L.G. ALLARD et ai, A New Canadian Federation, 
Montréal, Québec Liberal Party, 1980. 
72. A.E. SAFARIAN, Canadian Federalism and Economic Integration, Ottawa, Information 
Canada, 1974; M.J. TREBILCOCK, G. KAISER & J.R.S. PRITCHARD, "Restrictions on the 
Interprovincial Mobility of Resources ; Goods, Capital and Labour", in Intergovernmental 
Relations, Toronto, Ontario Economic Council, 1977 p. 101; MINISTER OF JUSTICE, 
Securing the Canadian Economic Union in the Constitution, Ottawa, Supply and Services 
Canada, 1980; F.R. FLATTERS & R.G. LIPSEY, Common ground for the Canadian common 
market, Montréal, The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983; R.E. HAACK, D.R. 
HUGHES & R.G. SHAPIRO, The Splintered Market, Toronto, James Lorimer & Co., 1981. 
73. Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada, 1985, hereafter called the Macdonald Report. 
74. Toronto, U. of T. Press, Supply and Services Canada, 1985-86. 
75. Macdonald Report, Vol. 3, p. 120: 
Economic analysis typically shows that distortions of the sort we have described have a 
small effect on output costs. Various calculations estimate that welfare losses for 1974 fell 
between a low of $ 130 million, or 0.11 per cent of gross national product (GNP) and a high 
of $ 1750 million, or 1.54 per cent of GNP, depending on the assumptions made. 
The principal study prior to the Macdonald Report is that of J. WHALLEY, "Induced 
Distortions of Interprovincial Activity : An Overview of Issues", in M.J. TREBILCOCK et ai 
(ed.), supra, note 31, p. 161. 
76. Ibid, See also, for example, R.E. HAACK, D.R. HUGHES & R.G. SHAPIRO, supra, note 72, 
p. 58. 
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from international trade liberalization may be much greater than earlier models 
suggested. The newer models attempt to take into account the significance of 
economies of scale. They might have equally dramatic effects if applied to the 
domestic market. 
[...] [T]he costs of barriers to trade may be extremely significant for individual 
firms, even if aggregate costs for the national economy do not appear to be 
large.77 
In my view, these conclusions and the recommendations of the Macdonald 
report7 8 do not give enough weight to the barriers. We cannot be sure about 
the overall effect on the economy, and in particular the effects caused by these 
barriers on important decisions of business leaders ; removal of the more 
substantial barriers might make many firms much more competitive in world 
markets7 9 . 
Conclusion: Some Thoughts on the Consequences of the Free Trade 
Agreement between Canada and the United States 
— Constitutional Aspects 
With respect to the United States, the main difficulty will be a political 
one : to win a two-thirds majority in the Senate, consenting to a treaty signed 
by the President. As noted earlier, there appears to be no problem in 
implementing the trade agreement: a treaty signed by the President and 
formally ratified by the Senate is "[...] the supreme Law of the Land [...]"8°. 
Furthermore, any additional legislation to implement the treaty receives the 
same constitutional paramountcy over state law81. 
77. Macdonald Report, Vol. 3, p. 120. The findings of the Macdonald Report appear to be 
influenced by the Research Study paper of N. SILZER & M. KRASNICK, "The Free Flow of 
Goods in the Canadian Economic Union", in M. KRASNICK., Perspectives on the Canadian 
Economic Union, Vol. 60, Toronto, U. of T. Press, 1986, p. 155, 187. I would suggest that 
its conclusion that, "[...] major constitutional change is not necessary at this time. Evidence 
of the cost of barriers is not sufficient to support a major overhaul" is too sanguine. 
78. Macdonald Report, Vol. 3, p. 391-393. 
79. All the studies enumerate and describe a lengthy list of provincially induced barriers to 
trade, among them : marketing boards ; taxes equivalent to customs duties ; government 
procurement policies; government subsidies including tax holidays; health, safety and 
labelling standards ; government as owner-manager of natural resources ; government 
monopoly enterprises such as liquor sales. SILZER & KASNICK, supra, note 77, p. 179, 180 
state, "There are at the present time few constitutional constraints upon the powers of 
provincial governments to impede the movement of goods in the ways just described". 
80. See supra, note 9 and accompanying text. 
81. Missouri v. Holland, supra, note 9. 
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The Canadian treaty position is much more problematic. As discussed 
earlier, no express treaty-making power was granteed to the Government of 
Canada. The source of its power to make treaties is twofold. First, by the 
general principles of international law, Canada's evolution as an independent 
nation brought with it the power to make treaties, vested in the central 
government82. The second source is found in the Letters Patent constituting 
the office of Governor General of Canada^, granting to the Governor 
General "[...] all powers and authorities lawfully belonging to [...] [the 
Monarch] in respect of Canada [...]". Accordingly, with respect to entering 
into and ratifying treaties — acts performed under English common law by 
the executive branch of government — there appears to be no difficulty. 
We have noted that under the common law treaties are not self-executing 
and do not form part of the internal law of Canada. When treaty implementation 
requires a change in that law, ordinary legislation must be passed84. As stated 
by Professor Hogg: 
In a case where Canada's internal law is not in conformity with a treaty binding 
upon Canada, then Canada is in breach of its international obligations and may 
be liable in international law to pay damages or suffer other sanctions, but the 
breach of a treaty is irrelevant to the rights of parties to litigation in a Canadian 
court. The only concession which the Canadian courts have been prepared to 
make in recognition of Canada's international obligations is to interpret 
statutes so as to conform as far as possible with international law.85 
Insofar as federal jurisdiction is concerned, this principle causes no more 
difficulty than it would in a unitary state, such as the United Kingdom, where 
the government that makes a treaty can obtain passage of necessary legislation 
through Parliament. 
The problem araises where treaty implementation concerns subject 
matter falling under provincial jurisdiction. Without a constitutional grant of 
treaty power to Parliament — such exists in the United States, or as existed in 
Canada with respect to Empire treaties and their implementation under 
section 132 of the Constitution Act, 1867 — the power to implement such 
treaties would seem to reside with provincial legislatures. Short of constitutional 
amendment, there are two possible avenues of interpretation to expand the 
implementation powers of the federal Parliament. 
There is no reason to anticipate that the first avenue — simply to 
construe an inherent treaty-implementing power from the fact of full Canadian 
82. See A.E. GOTI.IEB, Canadian Treaty-Making, Toronto, Butterworths, 1968, p. 6-10. 
83. R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, n° 35, II. 
84. Francis v. The Queen, L1956] S.C.R. 618. 
85. HOGG, supra, note 48, p. 246. 
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independence and the grant of executive power to the Governor General — is 
likely to be recognized by the Supreme Court. Indeed, there is a persuasive 
reason against such a construction. In the United States, the regional interests 
of the states are safeguarded by a popularly elected Senate, with each state 
represented by two senators regardless of its population ; for a treaty to be 
implemented, the Constitution requires consent by a two-thirds vote of the 
Senate. In Canada, under its system of responsible government, the House of 
Commons is elected on the basis of representation by population, party 
discipline is much greater than in the United States, and over sixty per cent of 
the population is in the two central provinces of Ontario and Québec. If in 
these circumstances, a broad, judicially construed treaty-implementing power 
existed, it would be possible for the federal government to push through the 
House of Commons legislation that trenched upon provincial jurisdiction 
while ignoring the contrary wishes of the majority of the provinces86. It seems 
that just such a problem confronts Australia, where Parliament's power 
'"with respect to... external affairs'" has been expanded into a treaty-
implementing power, but the extent ofthat power remains unsettled87. In the 
absence of any constitutional text as a basis for such a claim in Canada, it 
seems almost certain the Supreme Court would not embark on such a course. 
The second avenue would be a gradually expanded interpretation of 
existing federal legislative powers, especially the trade and commerce power, 
in aid of the treaty-making responsibilities of the federal government. A 
legitimate basis for expanding power in this area might be found in the bona 
fide, traditional exercise of the treaty-making power by the federal government 
in such matters as the G.A.T.T. and free-trade with the United States. This 
suggestion requires some elaboration. 
The leading case on Canada's lack of treaty-implementing power, A.G. 
of Canada v. A.G. of Ontario** (Labour Conventions), was decided in 1937. 
In the post First World War period, Canada had adopted and ratified three 
treaties to guarantee minimum working conditions for all workers. A 1925 
decision of the Privy Council, Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider*9, 
had made it clear that Parliament had no authority to legislate with respect to 
86. Ontario and Quebec aslo have fifty percent of the seats in the Senate and would need very 
little extra support to carry the Senate. Moreover, it remains unlikely that an appointed 
Senate would long resist the clear majority will of the elected House of Commons by 
refusing to pass treaty-implementing legislation. (Prospects for change in the Senate's 
legitimacy and powers consequent to the Meech Lake Accord, whereby the provinces 
would nominate senators, remain very speculative.) 
87. Hogg, supra, note 48, p. 248-249. 
88. [1937] A.C. 326. 
89. [1925] A.C. 396. 
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labour disputes generally. Apart from industries under federal jurisdiction 
such as banks and interprovincial railways, labour relations jurisdiction 
belonged to the provinces under their authority over "Property and Civil 
Rights in the Province". 
In the Labour Conventions case, Lord Atkin speaking for the Privy 
Council easily dismissed any suggestion that the Empire treaty-implementing 
section 132 could apply to treaties entered into by Canada in its own name. 
He also found that there was no inherent legislative power with respect to 
treaties as such ; there were only those powers assigned to either federal or 
provincial legislatures according to sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867. He applied the decision in the Snider case, holding that the 
provinces had jurisdiction over labour relations. Thus it depended on them to 
pass implementing legislation to honour Canada's commitments under the 
labour conventions. Lord Atkin left us with as oft-quoted statement to 
describe Canada's international competence: 
While the [Canadian] ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign 
waters she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part 
of her original structure.90 
However, this view of the treaty-implementing power has not gone 
unchallenged. In MacDonaldv. Vapour Canada Ltd.91, Laskin C.J., speaking 
for the majority, showed a willingness to reconsider the Labour Conventions 
case. After reviewing Lord Atkin's opinion and subsequent comments suggesting 
that the Labour Conventions decision might be reconsidered, the Chief 
Justice said : 
Although the foregoing references would support a reconsideration of the 
Labour Conventions case, 1 find it unnecessary to do that here because, 
assuming that it was open to Parliament to pass legislation in implementation of 
an international obligation by Canada under a treaty or Convention (being 
legislation which it would be otherwise beyond its competence), 1 am of the 
opinion that it cannot be said that [the section in dispute] was enacted on that 
basis.n 
The opinion of Dickson, J. in A.G. of Canada v. Canadian National 
Transportation Ltd.93, while not concerned with treaty implementation, 
nevertheless makes statements that are relevant to salient aspects of a free 
trade agreement. The tests there set out by Dickson J., his reiteration of 
Laskin C.J.'s criteria of, "[...] the presence of a national regulatory scheme, 
90. Labour Conventions Case, supra, note 88, p. 354. 
91. Supra, note 53, p. 168-169. 
92. Ici., p. 169. 
93. Supra, note 58 and accompanying text. 
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the oversight of a regulatory agency and a concern with trade in general rather 
than with an aspect of a particular business" and, in particular, Dickson J.'s 
addition of two factors, " [...] (i) that the provinces jointly or severally would 
be constitutionnally incapable of passing such an enactment, and (ii) that 
failure to include one or more provinces or localities would jeopardize 
successful operation in other parts of the country"94 would seem to be 
conditions necessarily part of a free trade arrangement with the United 
States. Accordingly, there may be fertile ground for growing support of 
Canada's commercial treaty obligations through legislation that establishes a 
national scheme implemented by a federal administrative body. 
— Implications of Canada's Treaty-Implementing Deficiencies 
At the time of writing, Canada and the United State have signed a Free 
Trade Agreement and its text has been published 95, but it has not been 
ratified by the American Senate, nor has Parliament passed implementing 
legislation. What role does the Agreement give to the provinces and states? 
Since some provinces have stated their opposition to the Agreement, will 
their refusal to collaborate affect its successful implementation? A quick 
review of those parts of the Agreement that appear to relate to provincial 
jurisdiction may give some tentative indications of areas of difficulty. 
Article 102 states that the objectives of the Agreement are to : 
a) eliminate barriers to trade in goods and services between the territories of the 
Parties ; 
b) facilitate conditions of fair competition within the freetrade area ; 
[•••] 
The first reference to the provinces follows immediately in Article 103 : 
The Parties to the Agreement shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken 
in order to give effect to its provisions, including their observance, except as 
otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state, provincial and local 
governments. 
It would seem, then, that the federal government has undertaken responsibility 
for dissenting and recalcitrant provinces to comply with obligations under the 
Agreement. What is expected of the provinces ? 
Article 501 incorporates G. A.T.T. rules regarding "[...] national treatment 
[...]" of goods that are imported from the territory of the other contracting 
parties; Article 502 goes on to say that a province or state shall give 
94. Id., p. 267, 268. 
95. Ottawa, Department of External Affairs, January 1988. 
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"treatment no less favourable than the most favourable treatment accorded 
by such province or state to [...] goods [...] of the Party of which it forms 
part". Thus, apart from exceptions within the Agreement — and there are 
major exceptions — under Article 103, a breach of the requirement for 
national treatment by a province will be a breach by the federal government 
of its responsibilities. 
The first major derogation from the above obligation occurs in Chapter 
6 "Technical Standards". Article 601 (2) states: 
The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to any measure of a provincial or 
state government. Accordingly, the Parties need not ensure the observance of 
these provisions by state or provincial governments. 
It is generally accepted that many technical standards for manufactured 
goods and agricultural products, ostensibly passed as health and safety 
measures, amount to measures of equivalent effect to tariffs and quotas, 
whether or not they were deliberately designed as such. Yet Article 601 
exempts provincial and state measures, no matter how severe an impact they 
may have as barriers to trade. Since the provinces have established a large 
number of technical standards, those that act as barriers to interprovincial 
trade96 will remain also as barriers to bilateral trade between Canada and the 
United States. By contrast, within their own jurisdiction the two federal 
governments undertake to harmonize technical standards in order to eliminate 
them as barriers. 
Chapter 7 of the Agreement deals with agriculture. Article 701 prohibits 
the introduction of export subsidies on agricultural products, or their sale 
below cost by government marketing agencies. In addition, Article 704 (1) 
prohibits quantitative import restrictions or "[...]measure[s] having equivalent 
effect on meat goods [...]". This Article appears to apply to provinces, and if 
the above words are found to include technical standards that amount to 
measures having equivalent effect, there may be a conflict with Article 601, 
which exempts provincial technical standards. 
The remainder of Chapter 7 — in particular, Article 708 — obligates the 
two federal governments to "[...]work toward the elimination of technical 
regulations and standards [...]" that restrict trade in agriculture unfairly. This 
extensive Article requires much detailed cooperation, with the phrase "work 
toward" repeated a number of times. There is no mention of provinces and 
states. 
96. See, notes 72-79 and accompanying text. 
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Chapter 8 is concerned with wine and distilled spirits. Article 801 states 
that the national treatment requirements of Article 502 "[...]shall not apply 
to: a) a non-conforming provision of any existing measure [...]" or its 
continuation or prompt renewal. However, the remainder of Chapter 8 sets 
out a schedule and other details for requiring the elimination of many barriers 
currently maintained by provincial liquor commissions, and especially for 
doing away with differentials in price mark-ups for wine that originates 
outside the province. Accordingly, Chapter 8 requires provinces to change 
their current practices, and restricts their future discretion in marketing wines 
and distilled spirits within the province. 
Article 1301 of Chapter 13, dealing with government procurement, states 
that, "[...] the Parties shall actively strive to achieve, as quickly as possible, the 
multilateral liberalization of international government procurement policies 
to provide balanced and equitable opportunities". The Annex to Article 
1304.3 lists those entities to which the Chapter applies : they are exclusively 
federal government agencies. Accordingly, we must conclude that the vast 
array of provincial and state government agencies are left to continue their 
discrimination in favour of local suppliers of goods and services. 
Chapters 14 to 16 inclusive, covering such important matters as freedom 
to provide services and make investments, create greater uncertainty. These 
provisions require each Contracting Party to give "like treatment" with 
respect to covered services97 provided by nationals of, and investment 
originating in the territory of, the other contracting party. The provinces are 
mentioned in Article 1402 (2): 
The treatment accorded by a Party under paragraph I shall mean, with respect 
to a province or a state, treatment no less favourable than the most favourable 
treatment accorded by such province or state in like circumstances to persons of 
the Party of which it forms a part. 
However, paragraph 5 of this Article is a grandfather clause exempting 
existing measures and their continuation or prompt renewal. A consequence 
might be that major modernizing and redrafting of laws governing a profession 
may be discouraged for fear of falling outside the exemption and thus having 
to surrender protectionist measures. In an attempt to encourage movement 
away from discriminatory exemptions, Annex 1404 (A), a sectoral annex 
97. Although not all services are covered by the Agreement, Annex 1408 sets out a very large 
number including special services in agriculture, mining, construction, insurance and real 
estate, and commerce generally. These include such provincially regulated areas as 
insurance brokerage and real estate agencies, automotive rental and leasing, and the 
professions of accounting, architecture, engineering and surveying. 
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concerning architecture, requires the Parties to "[...] encourage their respective 
states and provincial governments [...]" to harmonize their laws with respect 
to licensing and establishing professional standards. 
This cursory review of potential provincial obligations is not intended to 
be exhaustive but merely to indicate some problem areas. There is an area 
where I think that federal legislation regulating the conditions of sale of 
imported goods — whether it be meat goods in Article 704, or wines and 
spirits in Chapter 8 — is supported by the Supreme Court decision in Caloil 
Inc. v. Attorney General of Canada^. Paraphrasing the principle there 
expressed, I would suggest that "Parliament may regulate the importation of 
goods from foreign countries, including as part of the regulatory scheme 
provisions governing the distribution of goods within Canada". 
In summary, there appear to be two major areas of the Agreement that 
relate in some manner to the provinces : 
a) Those where the provinces are expressly bound and the federal government 
is responsible for breach (as with wines and spirits), but where federal 
legislative power may well prevail if a province refuses to conform to the 
terms of the Agreement ; 
b) those where the provinces are exempted expressly (as with technical 
standards), or by implication (as in government procurement). 
In addition, there are areas of potential conflict in interpretation such as, 
whether the Article 601, which exempts provinces from harmonizing technical 
standards, thereby excuses breach of Article 704, which prohibits measures 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on meat goods. Moreover, 
the various grandfather clauses create a disincentive to major changes in 
existing laws, and may make it difficult to predict the consequences of any 
changes. Thus, even a cursory review provides evidence of uncertainty and an 
invitation to litigation regarding the role of the provinces under the 
Agreement. 
Even if provinces support the Agreement on Free Trade and subsequently 
enter into intergovernmental arrangements with the federal government, the 
98. Supra, note 49, p. 553. There a unanimous court upheld federal legislation regulating the 
distribution of imported oil within Ontario by restricting its sale to an eastern portion of the 
province. In a short concurring opinion, Laskin J. supported the decision, "[...] on the 
ground [...] that the admitted authority of Parliament to regulate importation of goods 
from foreign countries was validly exercised in this case in including as part of the 
regulatory scheme a provision restricting the area of distribution of goods within Canada 
by their importer". 
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legal status of such agreements is unclear, including the question of whether 
or not third parties can or should have any rights under them". 
— The Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution and Enforcement 
Since most provisions in a broad agreement on trade must be stated in 
general terms, they are open to conflicting interpretations ; subsequent 
disputes between the Parties must be adjudicated by a tribunal, as in the 
European Community where the Court of Justice has the last word. Thus, 
dispute resolution and enforcement are crucial elements in a system of free 
trade. The provisions of the Agreement represent a serious effort to create 
effective mechanisms, but because of inherent difficulties in a two party 
arrangement, they may not be successful. 
Chapters 18 and 19 contain the Institutional Provisions. Article 1802 
establishes the Canada-United States Trade Commission. The principle tasks 
of the Commission are "[...] to supervise the implementation of the Agreement 
[...]" and "[...] to oversee its further elaboration [...]"; it is an administrative 
and policy-making body that will take decisions "[...] by consensus [...]"; 
without the agreement of both Parties no decision can be taken. 
Article 1807, establishes a panel of arbitrators to hear disputes left 
unresolved before the Commission itself. The panels hear all disputes arising 
under the Agreement except for Financial Services (Chapter 17), which are 
left to negotiation, and Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases (Chapter 
19) which have their own arbitral system, discussed below. The Chapter 18 
process is sophisticated: it creates a "[...] roster of individuals [...] chosen 
strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment [...] 
Panelists shall not be affiliated with or take instructions from either Party". 
When a panel is selected, two members shall be citizens of each country, and if 
neither the Commission nor the four appointed panelists can agree on a fifth 
panelist who shall chair the panel, the fifth shall be chosen by lot from the 
roster. 
On first impression, this process may seem to contain a surprising 
concession to Canada : the United States with a population and economy 
more than ten times the size of Canada's, agrees to the establishment of 
arbitration panels that are as likely to have a majority of Canadians as they 
are to have a majority of Americans. However, when we examine the 
99. See, N.D. BANKES, C D . HUNT & J.O. SAUNDERS, "Energy and Natural Resources: The 
Canadian Constitutional Framework", in M. KRASNICK, Case Studies in the Division of 
Powers, Toronto, U. of Press, 1986, p. 53, p. 81-97, esp. p. 96-97. 
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procedures of Articles 1805 and 1806 the concession may not be as large as it 
seems. 
When the Parties fail to resolve a dispute by negotiation, either Party 
may invoke the procedures of Articles 1805 and 1806, for "[...] binding 
arbitration [...]". First, the right to insist on arbitration appears to be limited ; 
the Commission is required to refer to arbitration only those disputes 
concerning "[...] Emergency Action [...]" under the transitional provisions of 
Chapter l l 1 0 0 ; it may refer other disputes if it chooses. Since the Commission 
operates by consensus, each Party retains the option of blocking a reference 
to binding arbitration in all other disputes 101. 
Second, Article 1806 uses the word "binding" in its traditional international 
law meaning rather than in the supranational sense employed by the European 
Community. Under Article 1806(3), an arbitral decision is binding only in the 
sense that if the offending Party "[...] fails to implement [...] the findings of a 
binding arbitration panel [...] then the other Party shall have the right to 
suspend the application of equivalent benefits of this Agreement to the non-
complying Party"102. In other words, the remedy of an aggrieved Party 
remains retaliation, as it is without a free trade agreement, but with the 
blessing of the Agreement to make retaliation legitimate. In the European 
Community, member states have agreed to be bound by decisions of the 
Court of Justice. In particular, domestic courts accept Court of Justice 
interpretations of the treaties and domestic legislation as binding ; when the 
100. Articles 1101 and 1103 apply only to temporary emergency suspensions of transitional 
provisions by one Party. 
101. A catchall provision. Article 2011 (I), creates some ambiguity. It permits a Party to invoke 
Article 1806, the Arbitration clause, only "[...] with the consent of the other Party [...]". 
It also states, "[...] [a] Party may [...] invoke the consultation provisions of Article 1804 and 
[...] proceed to dispute settlement pursuant to Articles 1805 and 1807 [...]". [emphasis 
added]. Oddly, paragraph 2 alone of Article 1807 applies to the procedures of Article 1805. 
That paragraph states, "[...] the Commission, upon request of either Party, shall establish a 
panel of experts to consider the matter", [emphasis added]. There are no other references to 
a "panel of experts" — all other references are to arbitration panels — and no explanation 
of what is meant by "[...] to consider the matter". Moreover, Article 1806, the Arbitration 
clause, expressly incorporates paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of Article 1807, while deliberately 
omitting paragraph 2 and its peculiar "panel of experts". 
It would seem that the right to consideration by a panel of experts is not a right to 
arbitration. 
102. Under Article 1807 (8), the Commission is not bound to accept the specific recommendations 
of an arbitral panel : "Upon receipt of the final report of the panel, the Commission shall 
agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with the recommendation 
of the panel. Whenever possible, the resolution shall be non-implementation or removal of 
a measure not conforming with this Agreement [...]". [emphasis added]. 
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Court finds that a law of a member state offends a treaty obligation and 
should be struck down, the domestic court complies. 
In a multilateral arrangement such as the G.A.T.T., retaliation by a 
number of aggrieved signatories might possibly be effective to convince an 
offending party to rescind its impugned action. However, in an ongoing and 
more highly structured bilateral arrangement between two unequal parties, I 
suggest that retaliation is an ineffective, and very likely destructive, remedy — 
destructive of the whole Agreement. Indeed, the strongest argument in favour 
of an offending party complying with the finding of an arbitral panel is that 
failure to do so will tend seriously to undermine the Agreement. How 
persuasive this argument might be in the United States Congress is another 
matter. Whether Congress, without the party discipline of the parliamentary 
system and frequently at odds with the administration, could be persuaded to 
comply with a panel decision by amending American law is at best highly 
speculative. 
Chapter 19 establishes Panels for Dispute Settlement especially for 
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, the area most likely to produce 
conflict. There are strict limits on the application of this Chapter. First, 
Article 1901 applies only to goods ; complaints with respect to allegations of 
dumping services cheaply and countervailing measures are not covered. 
Second, under Article 1902(1) and (2), "Each Party reserves the right to apply 
its antidumping law and countervailing duty law to goods imported from the 
territory of the other Party [...]" and "[...] to change or modify its antidumping 
law or countervailing duty law [...]" subject to certain procedural requirements 
and consistency with G.A.T.T. provisions. The Parties undertake to work 
toward development of a new joint system of rules within five to seven years 
(Articles 1906 and 1907). 
The binational panels in this Chapter are established in a manner similar 
to that of the arbitration panels in Chapter 18. However, pursuant to Annex 
1901.2(2) and (4), in recognition of the technical and legal nature of disputes 
on antidumping and countervailing, the chairman and a majority of the 
panelists are to be lawyers. 
Article 1903 gives each Party a right to refer any amendment to a current 
antidumping or countervailing duty statute to a panel for a "[...] declaratory 
opinion [...]". As in Chapter 18, the remedy when an offending Party fails to 
pass remedial legislation in compliance with a panel opinion is retaliation, or 
in the extreme case, termination of the Agreement upon 60-day written 
notice. 
Article 1904 undertakes a considerably more ambitious step toward 
supranational determination of disputes with respect to decisions of domestic 
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tribunals on antidumping and countervail. Paragraph l states, "[...] the 
Parties shall replace judicial review of final antidumping and countervailing 
duty determinations with binational panel review". Paragraphs 2 and 5 give 
to each Party, as well as to private parties who would be entitled to standing 
before a domestic body, a right to "[...] review of a final determination [of a 
domestic tribunal] by a panel [...]". 
The panel's role is much like that of the European Court of Justice: 
when it disagrees with the decision of a domestic tribunal it will not issue a 
binding determination of its own ; rather, under paragraph 8, it will remand 
its determination to the domestic tribunal "[...] for action not inconsistent 
with the panel's decision". The following paragraphs complete the powers 
needed to make the decisions binding: 
9. The decision of a panel under this Article shall be binding on the Parties 
with respect to the particular matter between the Parties that is before the panel. 
II . A final determination shall not be reviewed under any judicial review 
procedures of the importing Party if either Party requests a panel with respect to 
that determination within the time limits set forth in this Article. Neither Party 
shall provide in its domestic legislation/or an appeal from a panel decision to its 
domestic courts, [emphasis added]. 
Under paragraph 15, the Parties undertake to amend their statutes and 
regulations in general and to make certain specified amendments in order to 
make the scheme workable. 
If the Free Trade Agreement is ratified by both Parties and if the 
required amendments to domestic legislation are passed, Chapter 19 will 
implement a significant institutional step in establishing an ongoing suprana-
tional mechanism for dispute resolution. Indeed this may be the most 
important element of the Agreement. 
It is difficult to predict the relative importance of the two methods of 
dispute resolution — the "international law" system in Chapter 18 to resolve 
more general issues of implementation and policy making, and the "suprana-
tional law" system in Chapter 19 to resolve disputes regarding antidumping 
and countervail. The experience of the European Community and the 
deference that judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals usually pay to a superior 
tribunals suggest that the Chapter 19 system of arbitration should be successful. 
It would be hoped that disputes under the weaker arbitral system of Article 18 
would play a minor role in implementation of the Agreement. If not, non-
compliance by either party might well tend to undermine the whole 
Agreement. 
